We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded.
INTRODUCTION
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A further key ingredient of an adwords auction is that bidders specify a budget that bounds the maximum payment chargeable for the ads in a given time frame (e.g., a day), effectively linking the different keywords. The introduction of budgets dramatically changes the nature of the auction. For instance, the Vickrey auction [Vickrey 1961 ], which was designed to maximize social welfare, might not be feasible since the required payment can exceed the budget. Moreover, it was observed in the seminal paper by Dobzinski et al. [2012] that maximizing social welfare cannot be achieved for budgeted auctions. Thus, they suggested to consider the weaker optimality criterion of Pareto optimality: If an allocation is Pareto optimal, then it is impossible to make a bidder better off without making another bidder or the auctioneer worse off. This is therefore the least one should aim for. Dobzinski et al. [2012] studied budgeted multiunit auctions with additive valuations; thus, their setting corresponds to adwords auctions where each keyword has only one slot and all slots have identical CTRs. They gave an Incentive Compatible (IC) auction based on Ausubel's ascending clinching auction [Ausubel 2004 ] that produces a Pareto-Optimal (PO) and Individually Rational (IR) allocation if budgets are public. They also showed that this assumption is strictly needed, that is, that no deterministic mechanism for private budgets exists if we insist on incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and Pareto optimality. This impossibility result for deterministic mechanisms was strengthened for our setting to public budgets in Dütting et al. [2012] . However, the question was open what optimality result can be achieved for randomized mechanisms. Thus, our first question to study is whether IC, IR, and PO auctions for selling ad slots can be achieved with randomized mechanisms.
Our Results. We give a positive answer to the preceding question and also present two further related results in different settings. All the results consider an auction for keywords with many slots. The participants are selfish agents that report valuations and have budgets and preference sets that are public knowledge.
Specifically, the article contains the following three results: (1) Multiple keywords with multiple slots: We show that the multiunit auction of Dobzinski et al. [2012] can be generalized to an adwords auction for multiple keywords having multiple slots, and budget limits for each bidder. We specifically model the case of several slots with different CTR, available for each keyword, and a bound on the number of slots per keyword (usually one) that can be allocated to a bidder. We first provide an IC, IR, and PO deterministic auction that provides a fractional allocation for the case of one keyword with divisible slots. Note that the impossibility result in Dütting et al. [2012] does not hold for divisible slots. In contrast, the impossibility result in Dobzinski et al. [2012] for multiunit auctions applies also to this setting, and achieving IC, IR, and PO deterministic auctions is only possible if budgets are public. Thus, we restrict ourselves to the public budget case. In our auction each bidder submits his valuation and budget at the beginning of the auction. The outcome of the auction will be a fractional allocation of the slots to the bidders and the allocation will be Pareto optimal. We then show how to probabilistically round this fractional allocation for the divisible case to an integer allocation for the indivisible case with multiple keywords (i.e., the adwords setting) and get an auction that is IC in expectation, IR in expectation, and PO.
(2) Multiple keywords with combinatorial constraints and multiple slots: So far we assumed that every bidder is interested in every keyword. In the second part of the article, we study the case that bidders are interested in only a subset of the keywords, that is, bidders have a nonzero identical valuation only on a subset of the keywords.
The valuations are additive and each bidder is assigned at most one slot for a given keyword. We restrict the model by allowing only identical slots for each keyword, that is, we require that all slots have the same CTR. This setting extends the combinatorial one-slot per keyword model considered by Fiat et al. [2011] to multiple slots. We present a variation of the clinching auction that is deterministic, IC, IR, and PO.
(3) Finally, we also study nonadditive valuations, namely, valuations with diminishing marginals. That is, the increase in valuation for getting an additional item does not increase with the number of items that are already allocated to the bidder. We show that even in the multiunit (one-slot per keyword) case there is no deterministic, IC, IR, and PO auction for private diminishing marginal valuations and public budgets. This shows how budgets complicate mechanism design: For the nonbudgeted version of this setting Ausubel [2004] gave his deterministic mechanism.
Related Work. Ascending clinching auctions are used in the FCC spectrum auctions (see Milgrom [2000] , Ausubel and Milgrom [2002] , and Ausubel [2004] ). For a motivation of adwords auctions see Nisan et al. [2009] on Google's auction for TV ads.
We first compare our results with those of a recent work by Goel et al. [2012] that was developed independently at the same time. They studied IC auctions with feasible allocations that must obey public polymatroid constraints and agents with identical or separable valuations (see their Lemma 3.10) and public budgets. The problem of auctions with polymatroid constraints was first studied by Bikhchandani et al. [2008] for unbudgeted bidders and concave utilities. The auction in Goel et al. [2012] is an adaption of the ascending auction in Bikhchandani et al. [2008] to the case of budgeted bidders. The polymatroid constraints generalize on one hand the multiunit case in Dobzinski et al. [2012] and the multiple slots with different CTR model presented in this article. On the other hand, the PO ascending auction in Goel et al. [2012] only returns allocations for divisible items, whereas in Section 4 of this article we demonstrate that these allocations can be rounded to allocations for indivisible items if we allow the auction to yield incentive compatibility in expectation. In Section 5, we present an IC, IR, and PO deterministic auction with feasible allocations of indivisible slots that obey matching constraints for the case of multiple identical slots.
There are three extensions of Dobzinski et al. [2012] : (1) Fiat et al. [2011] studied an extension to a combinatorial setting, where items are distinct and different bidders may be interested in different items. The auction presented in Fiat et al. [2011] is IC, IR, and PO for additive valuations and single-valued bidders (i.e., every bidder does not distinguish between the keywords in his public interest set). This is a special case of our combinatorial setting in Section 5 with multiple keywords but only one slot per keyword. (2) Bhattacharya et al. [2010] dealt with private budgets, and gave an auction for one infinitely divisible item, where bidders cannot improve their utility by underreporting their budget. This leads to a randomized IC in expectation auction for one infinitely divisible item with both private valuations and budgets. (3) Several papers [Aggarwal et al. 2009; Ashlagi et al. 2010; Dütting et al. 2011; Fujishige and Tamura 2007] studied envy-free outcomes that are bidder optimal (PO, respectively) in an one-keyword adwords auction. In this setting they give (under certain conditions on the input) an IC auction with both private valuations and budgets.
Our impossibility result in Section 6 is related to two impossibility results: Lavi and May [2012] show that there is no IC, IR, and PO deterministic mechanism for indivisible items and bidders with monotone valuations. Our result for indivisible items is stronger as it applies to bidders with nonnegative and diminishing marginal valuations. In Goel et al. [2012] the same impossibility result for divisible items and bidders with monotone and concave utility functions was given. Note that neither their result nor ours implies the other. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND DEFINITIONS
We have n bidders and m slots. We call the set of bidders I := {1, . . . , n} and the set of slots J := {1, . . . , m}. Each bidder i ∈ I has a private valuation v i ≥ 0, a public budget b i ≥ 0, and a public slot constraint κ i ∈ N >0 . Each slot j ∈ J has a public quality α j ∈ Q ≥0 . The slots are ordered such that α j ≥ α j if j > j , where ties are broken in some arbitrary but fixed order. We assume in Sections 3 and 4 that the number of slots m fulfills m = i∈I κ i as we could add dummy bidders with valuation v i = 0, if m > i∈I κ i , or we could add dummy items with quality α j = 0, if m < i∈I κ i .
Divisible case: In the divisible case we assume that there is only one keyword with infinitely divisible slots. Thus, the goal is to assign each bidder i a fraction x i, j ≥ 0 of each slot j and charge him a payment p i . An assignment matrix X = (x i, j ) (i, j)∈I×J and a payment vector p are called an allocation (X, p). We call c i = j∈J α j x i, j the weighted capacity allocated to bidder i. An allocation is feasible if it fulfills the following conditions: (1) the sum of the fractions assigned to a bidder does not exceed his slot constraint ( j∈J x i, j ≤ κ i ∀i ∈ I); (2) each of the slots is fully assigned to the bidders ( i∈I x i, j = 1 ∀ j ∈ J); and (3) the payment of a bidder does not exceed his budget limit
Indivisible case: We additionally have a set R of keywords, where |R| is public, and each keyword has the set of slots J. The goal is to assign each slot j ∈ J of keyword r ∈ R to one bidder i ∈ I while obeying various constraints. An assignment X = (x i, j,r ) (i, j,r) ∈I×J×R where x i, j,r = 1 if slot j is assigned to bidder i in keyword r, and x i, j,r = 0 otherwise, and a payment vector p form an allocation (X, p). We call
( r∈R x i, j,r ) the weighted capacity allocated to bidder i. An allocation is feasible if it fulfills the following conditions: (1) the number of slots of a keyword that are assigned to a bidder does not exceed his slot constraint ( j∈J x i, j,r ≤ κ i ∀i ∈ I, ∀r ∈ R); (2) each slot is assigned to exactly one bidder ( i∈I x i, j,r = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, ∀r ∈ R); and (3) the payment of a bidder does not exceed his budget limit (b i ≥ p i ∀i ∈ I).
Combinatorial indivisible case: In the previous setting each bidder is interested in each keyword. In the combinatorial case not all keywords are identical; every bidder i ∈ I has a publicly known set of interest S i ⊆ R, and valuation v i for all keywords in S i and a valuation of zero for all other keywords. We model this case by imposing x i, j,r = 0 ∀r / ∈ S i . Note that in all cases the budgets are bounds on total payments across keywords and not bounds on prices of individual keywords.
Properties of the auctions:
The utility u i of bidder i for a feasible allocation (X, p) is c i v i − p i ; the utility of the auctioneer (or mechanism) is i∈I p i . A feasible allocation (X , p ) is Pareto superior to the feasible allocation (X, p) if (1) the utility of no bidder in (X , p ) is less than his utility in (X, p), (2) the utility of the auctioneer in (X , p ) is no less than his utility in (X, p), and (3) at least one bidder or the auctioneer is better off in (X , p ) compared with (X, p). We study auctions that select feasible allocations obeying the following conditions: (Bidder rationality) u i ≥ 0 for all bidders i ∈ I, (Auctioneer rationality) the utility of the auctioneer fulfills i∈I p i ≥ 0, and (No-positive-transfer) p i ≥ 0 for all bidders i ∈ I. An auction that on all inputs outputs an allocation that is both bidder rational and auctioneer rational is called individually rational (IR) . A feasible allocation is Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no other feasible allocation (X , p ) that is Pareto superior to (X, p). An auction is incentive compatible (IC) if it is a dominant strategy for all bidders to reveal their true valuation. An auction is said to be PO if the allocation it produces is PO. A randomized auction is IC in expectation, IR in expectation (PO in expectation, respectively), if the preceding conditions hold in expectation, and IC ex post, IR ex post (PO ex post, respectively), if the conditions hold for every realized outcome. 
The Ascending Auction
The mechanisms presented in this article are based on the ascending auction by Ausubel [2004] for selling multiple identical items to bidders without budget constraints. We give in the following an informal description and an example of the execution of the auction with budgeted bidders. The input to the auction by bidder i is a vector v i (·) of marginal valuations and a budget b i . The value v i (k) is the valuation of bidder i for the k-th item when k − 1 items have already been allocated to him. At the beginning of the auction, the price per item is initially set to zero and then it is monotonically increased by the auctioneer until all items are sold. For each price p the bidders implicitly submit a demand: the demand at price p of bidder i having already allocated k items is equal to the minimum of (1) the number of unsold items, (2) the number of marginals of order bigger than k and value strictly bigger than p, and (3) the demanded number of items that can still be afforded at price p. An item is allocated to bidder i at price p if the total demand of all other bidders is strictly less than the number of unsold items, that is, at least one item is underdemanded. If no item can be allocated, then the price gets increased. More formally:
-I is the set of bidders.
-m is the number of unsold items. 
We give in the following an example of the execution of the auction with three bidders and three items. The marginal valuations and the budgets of the bidders are in Table I .
No item is sold at price lower than 2. The demand at price 2 is
No item is sold since the total demand of any two bidders is greater than or equal to 3. The demand of the bidders at price 4 is Price Bidder A Bidder B Bidder C 4 3 1 1
One item is sold to bidder A since the total demand of the other bidders is 2. The demand of the bidders at price 4 is now equal to Bidders A and B get allocated to one item each at price 8.
DETERMINISTIC CLINCHING AUCTION FOR THE DIVISIBLE CASE

Characterization of Pareto Optimality
In this section, we present a novel characterization of PO allocations that allows one to address the case of multiple divisible slots with different CTRs. Like previous characterizations of PO for other settings [Bhattacharya et al. 2010; Dobzinski et al. 2012; Fiat et al. 2011 ] our characterization ensures that no bidder can resell items (i.e., weighted capacity) to another bidder to increase his utility. However, in our setting, we have to consider that transferring weighted capacity between two bidders might result in the fractional exchange of slots between many bidders. We use the characterization to prove the PO of the auction given in Section 3.2. Given a feasible allocation (X, p), a swap between two bidders i and i is a fractional exchange of slots, that is, if there are slots j and j and a constant τ > 0 with x i, j ≥ τ and x i , j ≥ τ , then a swap between i and i can give a new feasible allocation (X , p)
then the swap increases i's weighted capacity and reduces i 's weighted capacity. To characterize PO allocations we first define for each bidder i the set N i of bidders such that for every bidder a in N i there exists a swap between i and a that increases i's weighted capacity. Given a feasible allocation (X, p) we use h (i) := max{ j ∈ J|x i, j > 0} for the slot with the highest quality that is assigned to bidder i and l (i) := min{ j ∈ J|x i, j > 0} for the slot with the lowest quality that is assigned to bidder i. To consider the case of slots with equal α-value we define h(i) : Figure 1 for an example with five bidders. The bidders a inÑ i are all the bidders such that through a sequence of trades that "starts" with i and "ends" with a, bidder i could increase his weighted capacity, bidder a could decrease his weighted capacity, and the capacity of the remaining bidders involved in the sequence would be unchanged.
The following lemma shows the nonreflexive transitivity ofÑ i . Before the tss slot 1 is assigned to bidder 1 and 3, slot 2 is assigned to bidder 1 and 2, and slot 3 is assigned to bidder 2 and 3. The tss swaps the half of slot 3 assigned to bidder 3 with the half of slot 2 assigned to bidder 2, and the half of slot 2 assigned to bidder 1 with the half of slot 1 assigned to bidder 3. onÑ i and, thus, on the current assignment. As we show in the following, theṽ i -value and the remaining budget b i − p i for each bidder i suffices to decide whether a given assignment is PO or not.
We say that a feasible allocation (X, p) contains a Trading Swap Sequence (δ, a) (for short, tss), where δ > 0 is the swapped amount of weighted capacity and a is a sequence a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k of bidders in I, if the following conditions hold: (S1) the sequence has no cycles, that is, a = a if = ; (S2) bidder a 0 has a higher valuation than bidder a k , that is, v a 0 > v a k ; (S3) we can swap weighted capacity δ from a +1 to a for all ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} in a certain way, in particular,
. . , k − 1}; and (S4) bidder a 0 has a remaining budget that could compensate bidder a k 's loss of weighted capacity δ, that is,
Figure 2 presents an example of an allocation containing a tss. Furthermore, we say that the allocation (X , p ) results from the allocation (X, p) through the tss (δ, a) where the length of the sequence a is k + 1 if
and all other entries of X are identical to the entries of X.
In the remainder of this section, we prove the following characterization of PO allocations.
THEOREM 3.2. A feasible allocation is PO, if and only if it contains no tss.
We show first that if an allocation (X, p) is PO, then it contains no tss. Next, we show that if a feasible allocation does not contain a tss, then it is PO. We show this in two steps, namely, Proposition 3.4 proves that the nonexistence of a tss depends on a certain condition for theṽ i 's of the bidders, and Proposition 3.8 shows that if this condition is fulfilled, then the allocation is PO. To show Proposition 3.8 we first need to extend the setsÑ i to deal with agents that occupy slots with identical quality. For this purpose we introduce the sets T i . The containment relation on the sets T i gives a total order on these sets (Lemma 3.6). Additionally, these sets are "tight" in the sense that no other feasible assignment can assign more weighted capacity to them (Lemma 3.7). This fact is crucial when showing Proposition 3.8.
The next lemma shows that for a given assignment X the relation "⊆" defines a total order on the sets T i with i ∈ I.
PROOF. We can restrict our analysis to the case i = u as otherwise
implies that all "≥" are "=" which gives us a contradiction. Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that h(u) > l(i). It follows that u ∈ N i ⊆Ñ i ∪ {i} and i = u implies u ∈Ñ i . By Lemma 3.1 it follows that all c ∈Ñ u with c = i satisfy c ∈Ñ i , and thus,
Moreover, we can show in the next lemma for any i ∈ I that given the set T i determined by a feasible assignment X, no other assignment allocates more weighted capacity to the set of agents T i .
LEMMA 3.7. Given a feasible assignment X and the set T i for an agent i ∈ I determined by X, then for any other feasible assignment X it holds that u∈T
Recall that since X is a feasible assignment it holds u∈I x u, j = 1 for all j ∈ J and j∈J x u, j ≤ κ u for all u ∈ I by definition. Further, recall that we assume in this section that u∈I κ u = m. Thus,
Notice that (Fact c) for all j ∈ J with α j > α a it holds that u∈T i x u, j = 1: Assume by contradiction that u∈T i x u, j < 1. Then there exists a w ∈ I \ T i with x w, j > 0 because feasibility of X implies u∈I x u, j = 1. Thus, h(w) > a = l(u) for some u ∈Ñ i ∪ {i} by Fact a, which implies w ∈Ñ i ∪ {i} ⊆ T i by Lemma 3.1. This leads to a contradiction to the assumption w ∈ I \ T i .
Next, we argue that (Fact d) for all j ∈ J with α j < α a it holds that u∈T i x u, j = 0. This is the case because otherwise there would be an agent u ∈ T i with x u, j > 0, which implies l(u) < a. This is a contradiction to the definition of a.
x u, j = κ, where the first inequality follows from feasibility of X, the second equality follows from Fact d, and the third equality follows from Fact b. Thus, m − κ + 1 ≥ a. Together with the ordering of the slots by α, this implies (Fact e) α j ≥ α a for all j ≥ m − κ + 1.
We now define j * = min{ j ∈ J|α j > α a }. By the following arguments we obtain the next sequence of equalities: The first equality follows from Fact d, the second equality follows from Fact b and Fact c, and the fourth equality follows from Fact e and α j ≤ α a for all j ≤ j * − 1 implied by the definition of j * .
j∈J:α j =α a u∈T i
In the next sequence of equalities the second equality follows from Fact c and Fact d, and the third equality from the preceding sequence.
Thus, the agents in T i have an aggregated weighted capacity equal to the weighted capacity of the assignment where the most valuable slots from m down to m − κ + 1 and no fraction of a slot below are occupied by T i . This is the "optimal assignment" for T i , that is, for any other feasible assignment X it holds that u∈T i j∈J α j x u, j ≥ u∈T i j∈J α j x u, j . Now we use the previous lemmata in the next proposition that gives a sufficient condition for the Pareto optimality of a feasible allocation (X, p).
PROOF. Let us assume by contradiction that we have a feasible allocation (X , p ) that is Pareto superior to (X, p) and (a) and (b) hold. The utility of the auctioneer does not decrease. Thus, the sum of the payments of the bidders fulfills i∈I p i ≥ i∈I p i . If i∈I p i > i∈I p i , then an allocation (X , p ) where i∈I p i = i∈I p i exists, which is Pareto superior compared to (X, p) as well: simply give the additional payments back to some of the bidders. We can therefore restrict our analysis to the cases with (Fact a) i∈I p i = i∈I p i .
In the following parts of the proof we study a set I * that contains all agents with positive valuations, and we define a sequence of subsets of I * ordered by "⊆" that starts with ∅ and ends with I * . First we show that all agents in I * who have not spent all their budget in (X, p) and appear the first time in a subset S of the sequence have the lowest valuation among all agents in S. Then we show that all agents in I * who spent all their budget in (X, p) cannot get more weighted capacity in X than in X. Furthermore, we use Lemma 3.7 to show that no subset of agents in the sequence can get more weighted capacity in X than in X. After this, we can show by induction over the sequence that the social welfare of X cannot be higher than the social welfare of X. This leads immediately to a contradiction to the assumed Pareto superiority of (X , p ) over (X, p) .
For all i ∈ I let the set T i from Definition 3.5 be determined by X. We define I * = i∈I:v i >0 T i and show first some facts about I * and I \ I * . By Lemma 3.6, "⊆" induces a total order on the sets T i and thus there is a "largest" T i * in this order. For this set T i * it holds that T i * = I * . Thus, (Fact b) there exists an i ∈ I with v i > 0 for which
* . Now we introduce an ordered sequence of subsets of I * that we use later in an induction. By Lemma 3.6 the relation "⊆" forms a total order on the sets T i with i ∈ B * := B ∩ I * . Reorder the bidders, such that T 1 , . . . , T |B * | are the sets T i with i ∈ B * ordered by "⊆" and that T 1 is the smallest set. We define T 0 = ∅ and T |B * |+1 = I * . Furthermore, we let
* and u ∈ T u , and moreover,
We partition I * into three sets, namely, I * ∩ B, C + , and C − . Recall that c i = j∈J α j x i, j and c i = j∈J α j x i, j for all i ∈ I. Formally, we define C = I * \ B, C + := {i ∈ C|c i > c i }, and C − := C \ C + and show (Fact f): C + = ∅, which implies that the agents with positive valuations who spent their full budget under X cannot get more weighted capacity under X . The next sequence of inequalities follows by the following arguments: The first inequality holds since p u = b u ≥ p u for all u ∈ C ⊇ C + , the second inequality follows from Pareto superiority of (X , p ) compared to (X, p), and the third inequality follows because
The next sequence of inequalities holds for the following reason: The first inequality follows from Fact a and Fact d, the second inequality follows by summing (1) for i = 1, . . . , |B * | + 1, and the third inequality holds since 
It follows that
Thus, since c u > c u for all u ∈ C + it follows that C + has to be empty and C = C − . We can prove now by induction that (Fact g)
for all T i . For i = 0 we have that T 0 = ∅ and thus the claim holds. For i > 0 we have
because of Fact e and by induction it holds that
Now we finish the proof by generating a contradiction. By Lemma 3.7, which applies by Fact b also for T |B * |+1 , it holds that u∈T i (c u − c u ) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , |B * | + 1, and thus,
by Fact c. Thus, the social welfare under (X, p) is at least as large as under (X , p ). This
By Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.8 we know that a feasible allocation that contains no tss is PO. Moreover, by Proposition 3.3 an allocation resulting from a tss is Pareto superior, and thus, a feasible allocation that contains a trading swap is not PO. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Multiple Keyword Auction for the Divisible Case
Next, we describe our deterministic clinching auction for divisible slots and show that it is IC, IR, and PO. The auction repeatedly increases a price "per weighted capacity" and gives different weights to different slots depending on their CTRs. To perform the check whether all remaining unsold weighted capacity can still be sold we solve suitable linear programs. We will show that if the allocation of the auction did not fulfill the characterization of Pareto optimality given in Section 3.1, that is, if it contained a tss, then one of the linear programs solved by the auction would not have computed an optimal solution. Since this is not possible, it will follow that the allocation is PO. A formal description of the auction is given in the procedure AUCTION.
The input values of procedure AUCTION are the bids v, budget limits b, and slot constraints κ that the bidders communicate to the auctioneer at the beginning of the auction, and information about the qualities of the slots α. We assume that bidders bid their valuation because Proposition 3.11 shows that bidding the valuation is a dominant strategy; thus, we use v i for bidder i's bid and valuation. Note that the auction is a so-called "one-shot auction"; the bidders are asked once for their bids at the beginning of the auction and then they cannot input any further data. In particular, the demand of bidder i for weighted capacity is computed by the mechanism based on i's remaining budget b i − p i , the current price π , and the bid 
while i∈I c i < j∈J α j do unsold weighted capacity exists 4:
for all bidder whose demand has to be updated 
update capacity and payment of bidder i 7: return (X, p) 12: end procedure
In the linear program defined next, bidder i and the coefficients c and d change during the auction, while the coefficients α and κ are fixed.
We assume throughout this section that v i ∈ N ≥0 and b i ∈ Q ≥0 for all i ∈ I.
2 Furthermore, we assume that the input I is ordered such that all i ∈ I with bid v i = 0 are in the order before all i ∈ I with bid v i > 0, and all i ∈ I with v i > 0 are ordered independently of their bids. This order is used by the for loop in line 4 and is needed to show PO in Theorem 3.12; it is necessary to avoid the existence of trading swaps that do not require monetary compensation. Finally, we assume that m = i∈I κ i . If m > i∈I κ i we could add dummy bidders with valuation v i = 0 and budget b i = 0, that is, they have to pay no money and they are not competing with the other bidders. If m < i∈I κ i we could add dummy items with quality α j = 0, that is, they have no value for any bidder. Thus, the slot constraints imply j∈J x i, j = κ i for all i ∈ I. The state of the auction is defined by the current price π , the weighted capacity c i that bidder i ∈ I has clinched so far, and the payment p i that has been charged so far to bidder i.
The crucial point of the auction is that it sells only weighted capacity γ i to bidder i at a certain price π , if it can sell j∈J α j − i∈I c i − γ i to the other bidders but not more. The auction computes γ i by solving a Linear Program (LP). We use an LP as there are two types of constraints to consider: the slot constraint in line (b) of the LP, which constrains "unweighted" capacity, and the demand constraint in line (d) of the LP, which is implied by the budget limit, and which constrains weighted capacity. In the homogeneous item setting in Dobzinski et al. [2012] and Bhattacharya et al. [2010] there are no slot constraints and the demand constraints are unweighted (i.e., α j = 1 for all j ∈ J). Thus, no LP is needed to decide what amount to sell to whom.
At the beginning of the auction the price π is zero and the demand variable for each bidder i is set to d i = ∞. For each iteration of the while loop the auction first solves an LP for one of the bidders i who has
weighted capacity in the next iteration of the while loop but has to pay a price of at least π + 1 for it. The auction continues the previous step until d i of each bidder i corresponds to his demand for price π + 1. Then it sets π to π + 1. To illustrate the mechanism we give the following example.
Example 3.9. There are two slots with qualities α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 2. Bidder 1 has valuation v 1 = 1, budget b 1 = 1, and slot constraint κ 1 = 1. Bidder 2 has valuation v 2 = 2, budget b 2 = 0.5, and slot constraint κ 2 = 1. The auction starts for both bidders with a price of zero and thus their demand is infinite. First, we solve an LP for bidder 1. He is assigned a weighted capacity of one for price zero, since the most weighted capacity that we can assign to bidder 2 is the quality of slot 2. Then by updating his demand variable we implicitly set the price of bidder 1 to one. Next, we solve an LP for bidder 2. After this we sell a weighted capacity of one to bidder 2, since the most weighted capacity that we can assign to bidder 1 is the quality of slot 2 and he can also afford just an additional weighted capacity of one. Then we set the price of bidder 2 implicitly to one and continue with the next iteration. We solve an LP for bidder 1; bidder 2 can only afford an additional weighted capacity of one half. Hence, we have to sell the other half that is left to bidder 1. Next, we sell the other half to bidder 2. Each bidder gets a weighted capacity of one and a half and pays a half. The only possible assignment is that each bidder gets half of the first slot and half of the second slot.
It is crucial for the progress and the correctness of the mechanism that there is a feasible solution for each LP we try to solve. PROOF. We show the claim by induction on the linear programs that Algorithm 1 solves. Let LP t be the t-th such LP. There is a feasible solution for LP 1 as the demand d i of every bidder is unlimited. Hence, we can set X such that j∈J x i, j = κ i ∀i ∈ I and can make γ i as large as necessary for every bidder i. Next, let us inductively assume that there was a feasible solution for LP t . As there exists a feasible solution for LP t , we obtain an optimal solution (X, γ ) by solving LP t . After the call, c i is increased by γ i , and thus, (X, γ f ) with γ The previous lemma implies that the final assignment X gives a feasible solution for the final LP. Thus, X fulfills conditions (1) and (2) for a feasible allocation. Condition (3) is also fulfilled as by the definition of the demand of a bidder, the auction guarantees that b i ≥ p i for all i ∈ I. Thus, the allocation (X, p) computed by the auction is a feasible allocation. As no bidder is assigned weighted capacity if the price is above his valuation and the mechanism never pays the bidders, the auction is IR. As it is an increasing price auction, it is also IC. We show this formally in the next proposition. PROOF. Since no bidder will ever pay a higher price than his reported valuation and the demand is set so that b i ≥ p i , individual rationality follows.
We next show incentive compatibility and usev for the bids and v for the real valuations. First observe that a bidder i with v i = 0 cannot increase his utility by biddingv i > 0. Bidder i's utility is zero when biddingv i = 0 and cannot become positive by biddingv i > 0.
Let us now consider a bidder i with v i > 0. We first show that our ordering assumption causes no problems. Observe that if i bidsv i = 0, then i is selected in an earlier or the same iteration of the for loop during the first iteration of the while loop when the price for the bidder is zero. That is, the set of bidders processed before i whenv i = 0 is a subset of the set of bidders processed before i whenv i = v i . Thus, all the bidders with positive bid still have infinite demand and the optimal solution of the LP for i cannot increase. More formally, assume first that i bids his valuationv i = v i , let the solution of the first LP for bidder i be (X, γ ), and let the parameters of the LP be d and c. 
Thus, (X, γ ) is a feasible solution for LP with objective value γ i = γ i . It follows that the optimal value is at most γ i . Since bidder i cannot obtain weighted capacity in the next iterations of the while loop if he bidsv i = 0 and a bidder never pays a higher price than his reported valuation it follows that biddingv i = 0 does not increase i's utility.
Again consider a bidder i with v i > 0 and recall that by the construction of the auction, each bidder i with v i > 0 never pays a higher price than his reported valuation. If bidder i's reported valuation isv i and 0 <v i < v i , his demand variable d i is zero for all prices larger thanv i . Thus, his utility cannot increase by reportingv i as the weighted capacity he gets for each price π ≤v i cannot increase and he will lose all weighted capacity that he clinched at a price larger thanv i . Moreover, if his reported valuation isv i > v i , he gets the same weighted capacity for each price π ≤ v i . He might receive additional weighted capacity at a price larger v i , but this cannot increase his utility. Thus, the auction is IC.
We show finally that the allocation (X, p) our auction computes does not contain any tss, and thus, by Theorem 3.2 it is PO. The proof shows that every tss in (X, p) would lead to a superior solution to one of the linear programs solved by the mechanism. Since the mechanism found an optimal solution this leads to a contradiction. PROOF. We will show that the allocation does not contain any tss. Let (X f , p f ) be the final allocation computed by the auction and assume by contradiction that there exists a tss (δ, a) where the length of a is k + 1. We define u = a 0 and w = a k . Consider the allocation (X , p ) that results from (X f , p f ) through the tss (δ , a) where δ = δ/2 and that is Pareto superior to (X f , p f ) by Proposition 3.3. Define c 
and (2) for all i ∈ I with
. was solved. Moreover, the price that he pays per "weighted capacity" in this and the following iterations is at least π * . It follows that γ
PROOF. Let i be a bidder in
Note that every such bidder has a remaining budget of
) for all the "weighted capacity" γ f i that was not clinched before LP * was solved. Moreover, the price that he pays per "weighted capacity" in this and the following iterations is at least π * + 1. It follows that γ 
. By Claim 1 and 
RANDOMIZED CLINCHING AUCTION FOR THE INDIVISIBLE CASE
We will now use the allocation computed by the deterministic auction for divisible slots to give a randomized auction for multiple keywords with indivisible slots that ensures that bidder i receives at most κ i slots for each keyword. The randomized auction has to assign to every slot j ∈ J exactly one bidder i ∈ I for each keyword r ∈ R. We call a distribution over allocations for the indivisible case Pareto superior to another such distribution, if the expected utility of a bidder or the auctioneer is higher, while the expected utilities of the others are at least as large. If a distribution has no Paretosuperior distribution, we call it PO. The basic idea is as follows: given the PO allocation for the divisible case, we construct a distribution over allocations of the indivisible case such that the expected utility of every bidder and of the auctioneer is the same as the utility of the bidder and the auctioneer in the divisible case. The mechanism for the indivisible case would, thus, first call the mechanism for the divisible case (with the same input) and then convert the resulting allocation (X d , p d ) into a representation of a distribution over PO allocations for the indivisible case. It then samples from this representation to receive the allocation that it outputs. As during all these steps the expected utility of the bidders and the auctioneer remains unchanged and the mechanism for the divisible case is IR and IC, the mechanism for the indivisible case is IR in expectation and IC in expectation. To show that the final allocation is PO in expectation and also PO ex post we use the following lemma. PROOF. We show first that for every feasible allocation (X, p) in the indivisible case there exists feasible allocation (X d , p) in the divisible case where all the bidders and the auctioneer have the same utility. The utility of the auctioneer stays unchanged because we leave the payments unchanged. We set x d i, j = 1 |R| r∈R x i, j,r for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J. The utility of bidder i is the same for (X, p) and (X d , p) , since the utility of bidder i is j∈J (
, j for all i ∈ I, and therefore it implies the slot constraint in (X d , p) . Since all the slots are fully assigned to the bidders in (X, p), and consequently for (X d , p) , it follows that (X d , p) is feasible. Given a probability distribution over feasible allocations for the indivisible case, transform each feasible allocation that has a nonzero probability into a feasible allocation for the divisible case. Then create a new allocation for the divisible case by adding up all of these feasible allocations for the divisible case weighted by the probability distribution. Since the weights are created by a probability distribution, they add up to one, and thus, the resulting combined allocation fulfills Conditions (1) and (2) of a feasible allocation. As the payment is identical to the payment for the indivisible case, Condition (3) is also fulfilled.
Lemma 4.1 implies that any probability distribution over feasible allocations in the indivisible case that is Pareto superior to the distribution generated by our auction would lead to a feasible allocation for the divisible case that is Pareto superior to
Thus, the mechanism for the indivisible case described previously is PO in expectation. Additionally, since our auction selects only allocations having a positive probability, each realized allocation is ex-post PO: if in the indivisible case there existed a Pareto-superior allocation to one of the allocations that gets chosen with a positive probability in our auction, then a Pareto-superior distribution would exist, and thus, a Pareto-superior allocation would exist in the divisible case. By the same argument as above this would lead to a contradiction. See Appendix A for a discussion of the differences between PO ex post and PO in expectation.
We still need to explain how to use the PO allocation (X d , p d ) for the divisible case to give a probability distribution for the indivisible case such that the expected utility of every bidder for the probability distribution is equal to their utility in the divisible case. We will use the following steps: (a) We will reduce the computation of the probability distribution to a scheduling problem with preemption on uniform processors with the objective to minimize the finishing time. (b) We use Birkhoff 's theorem [Schrijver 2003 ] to show that an optimal schedule exists and has finishing time one. (c) Then we argue that an algorithm by Gonzalez and Sahni [1978] can be used to compute a schedule with finishing time one. This schedule represents a probability distribution on feasible allocations in the indivisible case and we show how to use it to sample from the probability distribution. Computing the probability distribution and sampling from it can be done in time linear in the number of slots m.
We first define the input and the output clearly. For the computation of the probability distribution the input is the set of slots J, the set of bidders I, the slot constraints κ i for all i ∈ I, the qualities α j for all j ∈ J, and a feasible divisible allocation (X d , p d ) that also defines the weighted capacities c d i for all i ∈ I. The output is a function that gives us for each number t ∈ (0, 1] an assignment X(t) of slots to bidders, where each bidder i ∈ I gets κ i slots. The assignment X(t) is a binary matrix where (X(t)) i, j = 1 if and only if slot j is assigned to bidder i. For a random number T that is uniformly distributed on (0, 1], the expected weighted capacity E[ j∈J (X(T )) i, j α j ] for each bidder i ∈ I has to be equal to c d i . Given the assignment function X(t) it suffices to draw |R| numbers t 1 , . . . , t |R| uniformly from (0, 1], use the assignment X(t r ) for keyword r, and set p = p d . The expected utility of all bidders i ∈ I is equal to their utility in
In the scheduling problem we consider, we have m jobs with length l 1 , . . . , l m and m processors with speed s 1 , . . . , s m as input. Jobs can be processed on multiple processors, but not at the same time, and preemption is allowed. In a feasible schedule every job has to be finished. That is, if t λ, j is the time length that job λ is processed on processor j in the schedule, then m j=1 t λ, j s j = l λ for all λ ∈ {1, . . . , m}. The finishing time of a schedule is the time it takes until every job is finished. The goal in the scheduling problem is to find a schedule with minimal finishing time.
We first show how to convert the input for the computation of the probability distribution to the input of the scheduling problem. Recall that we suppose m = n i=1 κ i . We set λ 0 := 0, replace each bidder i ∈ I with κ i jobs λ i−1 + 1, . . . , λ i−1 + κ i =: λ i having length
, set (i) := {λ i−1 + 1, . . . , λ i }, and set := i∈I (i). Furthermore, each slot j ∈ J is a processor with speed α j .
Next, we show that a schedule with finishing time one gives us the desired assignment function. Suppose that we have an assignment of jobs to processors on the interval (0, 1] where no job is processed on multiple processors at the same time. As each processor represents one of the slots in J, we get an assignment function X(t) if we replace for each time t ∈ (0, 1] and for each bidder i ∈ I the jobs in (i) with bidder i. As | (i)| = κ i each bidder i gets κ i slots assigned and each slot is assigned to one bidder.
We now argue that the minimal finishing time t is one for scheduling problems when the inputs are generated by the preceding reduction. First we restate Birkhoff 's theorem, which we use for the argument.
THEOREM 4.2 (BIRKHOFF'S THEOREM [SCHRIJVER 2003]). Each doubly stochastic matrix is a convex combination of permutation matrices.
Recall that | | = |J| because | | = i∈I κ i = m = |J|. We build an m×m-dimensional square matrix T as follows. We assign for each bidder i ∈ I each job λ ∈ (i) to processor
. The matrix T has the entries t λ, j where λ ∈ and j ∈ J. We show next that T is doubly stochastic, that is, the entries of the matrix are nonnegative and for each column and for each row the sum of the entries is one. The sums are nonnegative because x d i, j ≥ 0 and κ i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J. As the assignment X d is feasible and j∈J x d i, j = κ i for all i ∈ I because m = i∈I κ i , it follows that for each column j ∈ J of T it holds λ∈ t λ, j = i∈I λ∈ (i)
i, j = 1, and for each row λ ∈ (i) with i ∈ I of T it holds j∈J t λ, j = j∈J
Since T is doubly stochastic, we can decompose T by Birkhoff 's theorem into a convex combination of permutation matrices. In a permutation matrix there is one entry in each column and each row that is one and all other entries are zero. Let k be the number of permutation matrices in the convex combination and ζ l be the coefficient of the l-th permutation matrix P l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We construct our schedule in the following way: for the time interval (
. By the definition of a permutation matrix, it follows that each job is computed on exactly one processor at the same time, and each processor computes exactly one job at the same time. The finishing time is one because the time intervals of the schedule are the coefficients of a convex combination, and thus, k l=1 ζ l = 1. As the schedule has no idle time, the finishing time cannot be less than one. Thus, every optimal schedule has finishing time exactly one.
(c) We can use the scheduling algorithm by Gonzalez and Sahni [1978] that minimizes the finishing time to compute an optimal schedule with finishing time one. The schedules computed by the algorithm have at most 2(m − 1) preemptions, and the computation has a time complexity that is linear in the number of jobs | | = m. The algorithm outputs a schedule for each job, which is represented by a list of the processors on which the job gets processed; the lists contain the start time and the end time of the assignments of the jobs to the processors. Thus, we can represent the assignment function X(t) by merging the lists of all the jobs in (i) to a list for each bidder i ∈ I. We can evaluate the i-th row of X(t) for a certain t by traversing the list of bidder i and setting (X(t)) i, j = 1 if and only if processor j is in the list and t ∈ (a, b] where a is the start time and b is the end time in the list entry. To sample from the probability distribution for the indivisible case we pick |R| random numbers t r , 1 ≤ r ≤ |R|, uniformly at random from (0, 1] and set for each bidder i and each slot j the value x i, j,r = X(t r ) i, j . The following theorem summarizes the results in this section.
THEOREM 4.3. A PO and IR allocation for the divisible case can be converted in polynomial time without a change of the (expected) utilities into a randomized allocation for the indivisible case that is PO in expectation, PO ex post, and IR in expectation. This results in a mechanism that is PO in expectation, PO ex post, IR in expectation, and IC in expectation.
THE COMBINATORIAL CASE WITH MULTIPLE SLOTS
We consider single-valued combinatorial auctions with multiple keywords and multiple slots of the same quality available on each keyword; we refer to this also as the keyword problem. We denote the keyword problem by K = (I, R, m, v, b, S) . The set I = {1, . . . , n} is the set of bidders. R is the set of keywords. The vector m = (m r ) r∈R denotes the number of slots (copies) for each keyword r ∈ R. We denote by S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) the vector of preference sets, where S i ⊆ R is the set of keywords of interest of bidder i ∈ I. All keywords in S i are valued v i by agent i ∈ I and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is the vector of valuations. All keywords not in S i are valued zero by bidder i. Finally, b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) is the vector of budgets. Preference sets S i and budgets b i are public knowledge.
As stated previously, all slots are identical, that is, they have the same quality. Every bidder is therefore indifferent between obtaining one or the other slot of the same keyword. However, at most one slot per keyword is allocated to a single bidder (i.e., κ i = 1). We also require that at least m r bidders are interested in keyword r ∈ R, as some slot would otherwise stay unsold. Thus, our setting can be described as the problem of allocating a multiset of keywords, with m r copies for keyword r ∈ R, under the constraint that each bidder i ∈ I can receive at most one copy of a keyword r ∈ S i .
We denote by G the bidder/keyword bipartite graph
Fiat et al. [2011] solved this problem for the case of m r = 1. The approach in Fiat et al. [2011] was based on (1) making decisions on which items to sell to which agent by solving B-matching instances on the node-weighted bidder/keyword bipartite graph G, where the bipartite graph has a weight on each bidder equal to her demand at the current per-item price, and on (2) characterizing Pareto optimality by the nonexistence of trading paths (simple alternating paths that satisfy additional conditions) in the bipartite graphs.
Along this section, we will refer to an instance of the problem described in Fiat et al. [2011] , where all the keywords have exactly one slot, as the item problem, in contrast to our keyword problem where many slots for each keyword exist.
We extend the approach in Fiat et al. [2011] by (1) considering selling slots on the basis of the computation of B-matchings in a bipartite graph that is also weighted on the keywords by the number of unsold slots, and by (2) showing that an instance of a keyword problem can be reproduced as an ad hoc constructed instance of an item problem.
A feasible allocation (H, p) of the keyword problem is denoted by a tuple H = (H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H n ), where H i ⊆ S i represents the keywords allocated to bidder i, and p = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) is the vector of payments. It holds that |{i ∈ I|r ∈ H i }| ≤ m r ∀r ∈ R, p i ≤ b i for all i ∈ I, and |H i | · v i ≥ p i . By assumption, for each item there are not more copies than the number of bidders interested in it, that is, |{i ∈ I|r ∈ S i }| ≥ m r ∀r ∈ R. We also represent H as a B-matching in the bipartite graph G. The utility of bidder i is defined by u i := v i |H i | − p i , and the utility of the auctioneer is n i=1 p i . Pareto optimality has been related in previous work [Dobzinski et al. 2012; Fiat et al. 2011 ] to the nonexistence of trading options between bidders. We use a definition of a trading path in graph G that also admits nonsimple paths.
Definition 5.1. A path σ = (i 1 , r 1 , i 2 , r 2 , . . . , i t−1 , r t−1 , i t ), where i k ∈ I for k = 1, . . . , t and r k ∈ R for k = 1, . . . , t − 1, is an alternating path for allocation H if (i k , r k ) ∈ H, r k ∈ S i k+1 , and r k ∈ H i k+1 for all 1 ≤ k < t. Definition 5.2. A path σ = (i 1 , r 1 , i 2 , r 2 , . . . , i t−1 , r t−1 , i t ) is a trading path with respect to allocation (H, p) if the following holds: (1) σ is an alternating path in H, (2) the valuation of bidder i t is strictly greater than the valuation of bidder i 1 (i.e., v i t > v i 1 ), and (3) the remaining (unused) budget b * i t of bidder i t at the conclusion of the auction is at least the valuation of bidder i 1 (i.e., b * i t
Note that a keyword or an item could appear multiple times in the trading path. In this case, the trading path contains cycles. An example of trading path is provided in Figure 3 . Now we formally define the concept of the item problem M. An item problem M is an instance of a keyword problem K where each keyword has exactly one copy, that is, for all r ∈ R holds m r = 1. An item problem represents the setting defined and studied in Fiat et al. [2011] . We say that an item problem is an equivalent item-problem M K of a keyword problem K and an allocation (H, p) if M K respects the following definition. -the set of itemsR of the equivalent item problem M K is derived by the set R and the vector m of the keyword problem K. For each r ∈ R exists a set C r containing m r items such that C k and C w are disjoint if k = w. We defineR = r∈R C r . -The preference set vectorS of the equivalent item problem M K is derived from K and (H, p). For each bidder i ∈ I we define the preference setS i as follows: For each keyword r ∈ S i in the keyword problem that is not allocated to i, that is, r ∈ H i , we add all m r items in C r toS i . For each keyword r ∈ S i in the keyword problem that is allocated to i, that is, r ∈ H i , we add only one item in C r toS i . We select this item such that for any two bidders i and i with r ∈ H i and r ∈ H i it holds that S i ∩ C r and S i ∩ C r are disjoint.
Therefore, we will use I, v, and b to describe the set of bidders, the vector of valuations, and the vector of budgets, respectively, in both the keyword problem and the item problem. Figure 4 shows an instance of a keyword problem, the outcome of the keyword problem, and the equivalent item problem.
We denote by G
Characterization of Pareto Optimality
Now we provide a characterization of Pareto optimality in Theorem 5.4. In order to prove the theorem, we initially prove that if the allocation is PO, then all the slots of the keywords are sold and there are no trading paths. In order to prove the other direction, we have to show that for every trading path of an equivalent item problem M K there is a corresponding trading path in the original keyword-problem K. ≥ v i 1 . Then we can decrease the payment of bidder i 1 by v i 1 , increase the payment of bidder i t by the same v i 1 , and move item r w from bidder i w to bidder i w+1 for all w = 1, . . . , t − 1. In this case, the utility of bidders i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t−1 is unchanged, the utility of bidder i t increases by v i t − v i 1 > 0, and the utility of the auctioneer is unchanged because the sum of the payments by the bidders is likewise unchanged. This contradicts the assumption that (H, p) is PO.
If direction. We now seek to prove the if direction: if all slots of the keywords are sold and there are no trading paths, then the allocation (H, p) is PO.
Assume that (H, p) is not PO. Further assume that H assigns all items. We will show that there is a trading path with respect to (H, p) . Since (H, p) is not PO, there must be some other allocation (H , p ) that is not worse for all players (including the auctioneer) and strictly better for at least one player. We can assume that (H , p ) assigns all items as well, as otherwise we could take an even better allocation that assigns all items. We construct an equivalent item problem M K from the keyword problem K and the allocation (H, p) of the keyword problem K.
For each allocation H of the keyword problem a corresponding allocationH in the equivalent item problem M K exists. It is constructed such that ∀(i, r) ∈ H, where i ∈ I is a bidder and r ∈ R is a keyword, there is an edge (i, j) ∈H, where j ∈ C r ⊆R and for each j ∈R there is only one ingoing edge. Note that since v =v and b =b, a feasible price vector p produced for K is a feasible price vector for M K . So for each outcome (H, p) of K we have a feasible outcome (H, p) for M K . Moreover, observe that all the bidders have the same number of outgoing edges in both H andH. Thus, for each bidder i ∈ I holds that u i := v i |H i | − p i =v i |H i | − p i and also the auctioneer's revenue does not change, that is, i∈I p i . Since the utility is equivalent for all the bidders and the auctioneer in both problems, it holds that if (H , p ) is not worse for all players (including the auctioneer) and strictly better for at least one player with respect to (H, p) in the original keyword problem K, then it is also true that (H , p ) is not worse for all players (including the auctioneer) and strictly better for at least one player with respect to (H, p) in the equivalent item problem M K . Since (H, p) is not PO in the equivalent item problem M K , we know from Theorem 2.4 in Fiat et al. [2011] that there exists a set of simple trading paths with respect to (H, p) .
In order to prove the theorem we need the following lemma. It shows that if a simple trading path exists in the equivalent item problem, then a trading path has to exist also in the original keyword problem K. PROOF. Since the price vector p, the valuation vector v and the budget vector b are the same in the keyword problem K and in the item problem, the existence of an equivalent trading path in K depends only on the structure of the trading path. Now, note that a simple trading path is an alternating path. So for each edge (i k , j k ) ∈ σ there is an edge (i k , j k ) ∈H where j k ∈ C r k . Thus, by the construction ofH there is an edge (i k , r k ) ∈ H.
For all the edges ( j k , i k+1 ) ∈σ , where j k ∈ C r k , we know by Definition 5.1 that j k ∈S i k+1 , and we know by Definition 5.3 that r k ∈ S i k+1 in the keyword problem. Moreover, we know that j k ∈H i k+1 and we will show that r k ∈ H i k+1 . Assume by contradiction that r k ∈ H i k+1 . Then exactly one item is in C r k ∩S i k+1 by Definition 5.3. Thus, this item has to be j k and by the preceding construction ofH it holds that j k ∈H i k+1 , which gives a contradiction. Hence, r k ∈ H i k+1 .
It follows that a simple trading pathσ in the equivalent item problem has an equivalent trading path σ in the original keyword problem.
Thus, by Lemma 5.5 we know that a trading path exists in (H, p).
Auction
We are ready to describe our auction, which generalizes the auction for the item problem proposed in Fiat et al. [2011] to an auction for the more general keyword problem.
We base the allocation of the items in the keyword problem on B-matchings computed on a bipartite graph G = (I ∪ R, E), where E = {(i, r) ∈ I × R|r ∈ S i }. The vertices have degree constraints, which represent the demand constraints for the bidders and the number of unsold slots for the keywords. The B matchings are the subgraphs of G where each vertex does not have more incident edges than its degree constraint. Given the vector B, that is, the demands and the number of unsold items and a graph G = (I ∪ R, E) it is possible to compute a maximal weight B-matching in polynomial time [Pulleyblank 1980 ]. We often denote such B-matchings simply by matchings. The idea of the auction is to sell slots at the highest possible price such that all slots are sold and no competition between bidders exists. On the contrary, the existence of a trading path indicates that there exists competition on the assignment in the path.
We define the auction in Algorithm 2. During the execution of the algorithm there is always a price π (initially zero), a set of unsold items R (i.e., items with unsold instances), a vector of remaining budgets b
, and a vector of the number of unsold slots that are instances of the same item (c r ) r∈R . We denote by u = r∈R c r the number of unallocated slots. The current demand of bidder i during the auction is the number of slots that bidder i could get allocated at price π and is denoted by d i . It is either equal to D i or to D + i , which are defined as follows:
Throughout the section we will refer to D i (π ) and D + i (π ) when there are no ambiguities on the other parameters. We now define the set I π := {i ∈ I|D i (π ) > 0} of bidders with positive demand and the subset π . At every price π we first try to sell slots to any exiting bidder because even if the utility of the exiting bidder does not increase with the new item, the utility of the auctioneer will and this is our last possibility to allocate something to him. After this, we have to verify if any bidder can obtain any slot and eventually sell that slot to him. We denote by B(¬{i}) the number of slots assigned in a maximal B-matching without the bidder i. An item is assigned to a bidder i when B(¬{i}) < u. If no item is assigned, we set d i = D Only now we can raise the price. The preference sets, the vector of the number of unsold slots, and the set of unsold items are updated every time a bidder gets allocated some item. Note that the auction presented in Algorithm 2 is a generalization of the auction provided in Fiat et al. [2011] .
In order to prove Pareto optimality we proceed as follows: we transform the instance of the keyword problem K to an equivalent instance of an item problem M K (each slot is an independent item) based on K and on the outcome (H, p) computed by Algorithm 2. Then we prove that running Algorithm 2 on the instance of the equivalent item problem produces the same outcome as Algorithm 2 on the instance of the original keyword problem. Since Algorithm 2 is a generalization of the algorithm proposed in Fiat et al. [2011] , the outcome of the item problem is PO; thus, it contains no trading paths. Moreover, the instance of the item problem is obtained from the instance of the keyword problem, and the outcome of the item problem and the outcome of the keyword problem are the same. Since the outcome of the item-problem is PO, we can prove that also the outcome of the keyword problem is PO. Note that in the keyword problem and in the item problem we run the same algorithms and the same random decisions are taken.
In order to prove that a keyword problem and the corresponding item problem will produce the same outcome in our auction we need some preliminaries and further definitions. Let G(I ∪ R, E) be the original bipartite graph in the original keyword problem K, (H, p) be the outcome of the original keyword problem, andḠ(I ∪R,Ē) be the graph obtained by the instance of the item problem M K . Let G π (Ḡ π , respectively) be the bipartite graph that constrains the active bidders and the unsold items at price π . We use the notation x π to indicate the state of some parameter x at price π . A summary of the introduced notation is given in Table II . if ∃i|B(¬{i}) < u then SELL({i}) 8:
For an arbitrary bidder i with
10:
end if 12:
end while 15: end procedure ALGORITHM 3: Selling to the Set Z of Bidders. For arbitrary (a, r) in Y with a ∈ Z, sell item r to bidder a and set S a ← S a \ {r}.
5:
until B(¬Z) ≥ u 6: end procedure A perfect matching at price π that does not include any edge (i, j) with j ∈ C r on the graphḠ π in the item problem
B(¬{i}) B(¬{i})
The number of slots assigned in a maximal B-matching without the bidder i Note: The first column refers to the keyword problem and the second column to the item problem. Construct interest graph G π :
-Each active bidder a ∈ I on the left with capacity constraint d a (π ).
-Each unsold item r ∈ R on the right with capacity constraint c r .
-Edge (a, r) from bidder a ∈ I to unsold item r ∈ R iff r ∈ S a .
3:
Return maximal B-matching with minimal number of items assigned to bidders in Z, amongst all maximal B-matchings. (1) and (2) are reached at the same price in both the keyword problem and the item problem, because, as we discuss previously, all the bidders have the same valuations and the same remaining budgets in both the problems as long as they share a common allocation. Condition (3) is satisfied in both problems (or in none) at price π since the problems share a common allocation. Note that by the construction of the item problem if H Thus, we use I π in both the keyword problem and the item problem, to refer to the set of active bidders at price π .
Next, we define the notion of equivalent B-matching.
Definition 5.8 (Equivalent B-Matching). A matching B π in the keyword problem on the graph G π and a matchingB π in the item problem on the graphḠ π are equivalent if there is an edge (i, r) ∈ B π where i ∈ I is a bidder and r ∈ R is a keyword if and only if there is exactly one edge (i, j) ∈B π where j ∈R and j ∈ C r .
We will refer with B π (i,r) to a perfect B-matching on the graph G π that does not include the edge (i, r). Moreover, we will refer withB π (i,r) to a perfect B-matching on the graph G π that does not include any edge (i, j) where j ∈ C r . In order to prove that the keyword problem and the item problem reach the same outcome we need to show that a B-matching feasible in the keyword problem has an equivalent B-matching feasible in the item problem. By Lemma 5.7 we know that the keyword problem and the item problem have the same set of active bidders, and the bidders in the item problem have a demand that is not less than their demand in the keyword problem. By Definition 5.3, for each edge (i, r) ∈ G there is at least one edge (i, j) ∈Ḡ where j ∈ C r . So for each B-matching feasible in the keyword problem we can construct an equivalent B-matching feasible in the item problem. Thus, we can show the following lemma. Since the outcome of the equivalent item problem (H,p) is the same as the outcome for the original keyword problem, also the remaining budgets of the bidders are the same. Now, by Lemma 5.13 we know that for each edge (i, r) ∈ H, where i is a bidder and r is a keyword, there exists an edge (i, j) ∈H such that i is a bidder and j ∈ C r is an item equivalent to a slot of the keyword r. We also know that if edge (r, i) ∈ σ , where r ∈ R is a keyword that satisfies r ∈ S i and r ∈ H i and i is a bidder, there exists a j that satisfies j ∈S i , j ∈H i , and j ∈ C r . Thus, if a trading path σ exists with respect to (H, p), then an equivalent trading pathσ exists with respect to (H,p). However, we know from Theorem 4.3 in Fiat et al. [2011] that no trading path exists in (H,p), which gives a contradiction. Hence, no trading paths exist with respect to (H, p). Thus, by Theorem 5.4 we know that (H, p) is PO.
Finally, we prove that the auction is truthful and individually rational.
THEOREM 5.17. Algorithm 2 satisfies truthfulness.
PROOF. Declaring a valuation v i is for bidder i equivalent to declare at which price to leave the auction.
First, assume that bidder i reports a valuation v i < v i . Note that for prices π < v i bidder i gets the same slots at the same prices as when bidder i reports v i . Also, for price π = v i it holds that bidder i does not get more slots when reporting v i : We denote the number of slots assigned to bidder i at price π by k i if bidder i reports v i , and by k i if bidder i reports v i . Furthermore, we denote the number of slots assigned to Q π \ {i} at price π by k Q if bidder i reports v i , and by k Q if bidder i reports v i . Since we sell as few slots as possible to exiting bidders (i.e., all remaining slots can still be sold to the remaining bidders) it holds that k i + k Q ≤ k i + k Q . Assume by contradiction that k i > k i . It follows that k Q > k Q . However, that means that also when bidder i reports v i we could assign only k Q slots to the bidders in Q π , which gives a contradiction. Thus, for price π = v i it holds that bidder i does not get more slots when reporting v i . Moreover, bidder i gets no slots for prices π with v i ≥ π > v i . Thus, bidder i has no incentive to bid v i . Next, assume that bidder i reports a valuation v i > v i . Note that for prices π < v i bidder i gets the same slots at the same prices as when bidder i reports v i . Moreover, every slot that is assigned to bidder i at a price π ≥ v i has no positive impact on his utility. Thus, bidder i has no incentive to bid v i . PROPOSITION 5.18. Algorithm 2 satisfies individual rationality.
PROOF. Since no bidder pays a higher price than his reported valuation and the demand is set so that b i ≥ p i , individual rationality follows.
IMPOSSIBILITY FOR DIMINISHING MARGINAL VALUATIONS
We consider in this section the setting of m ≥ 2 identical indivisible items and two bidders with private diminishing marginal valuations and public budgets. We show that there is no IC, IR, and PO deterministic mechanism for this case. As in the previous sections, we use I := {1, . . . , n} to denote the set of bidders. Furthermore, for each bidder i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, . . . , m} let v i (k) ≥ 0 be bidder i-th marginal valuation for the k-th item assigned to him. A bidder i has diminishing marginal valuations if v i (k) ≥ v i (k + 1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}. We show the following theorem. THEOREM 6.1. There is no IC, IR, and PO deterministic mechanism for m ≥ 2 identical indivisible items and two bidders with private diminishing marginal valuations and public budget constraints.
